Established at the height of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the intergovernmental European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has, potentially, considerable influence over decisions on the provision of loans to Eurozone member state governments and on the recapitalization of banks. Legally and organizationally, the ESM is an international financial institution and thus its accountability can be compared to that of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international financial institutions. However, the ESM's governance structure and decision-making procedures show that it is deeply embedded in the Eurozone governance architecture, resulting in a 'dual institutional embeddedness'. Focusing on vertical and horizontal accountability, combined with a learning perspective on accountability, this paper presents an assessment of the accountability mechanisms applicable to the idiosyncratic ESM and how these mechanisms work in practice.
Introduction
Concerns about limited democratic legitimacy and accountability have bedevilled the European Union (EU) alongside its growing competences in different policy areas and its perceived intrusiveness in the domestic political arenas of the member states. As Curtin shows (2007, p. 540), 'the European "administrative space" has grown phenomenally both in intensity and in scope over the course of the past two decades, in a manner that was certainly not predicted by the Treaty framers' (see also Flinders, 2001; Harlow, 2002; Lord, 2004) . Similar concerns about legitimacy and accountability have been raised about EU agencies (Curtin, 2007; Busuioc, 2009 ) and recent institutional additions to the EU governance landscape such as the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) for the financial sector and the new bodies created as part of the recently established Banking Union -notably, the Single Supervisory Board (part of but distinct from the European Central Bank) and the Single Resolution Board (Howarth and Quaglia, 2014) . This paper undertakes a critical assessment of the accountability of one recent institutional addition to the Eurozone governance system -the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The ESM formally came into existence on 27 September 2012, supplementing the temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) which is to be wound down when the last of its obligations are repaid. The ESM is a permanent financial mechanism that can wield funds to stabilize Eurozone member states and financial institutions in distress with the broader objective of safeguarding financial stability in the Eurozone. Current ESM reform proposals demonstrate the potential for the increased importance of the mechanism in EU economic governance. The Commission and a number of member states have called for the ESM to become the official financial backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), the Eurozone-wide bank resolution fund (EUObserver, 11 October 2017) . Moreover, the Commission and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have called for the ESM to be transformed into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) (Financial Times, 29 August 2017 , 6 December 2017 , 3 June 2018 , although Chancellor Merkel has insisted that the mechanism remain a non-EU intergovernmental body.
From a legal and organisational standpoint, the ESM is an intergovernmental body: it is an international organisation established by an international treaty that was signed by the Eurozone member states.
2 The ESM's intergovernmental status is demonstrated most clearly by the unanimity that applies to all major decisions and the exclusively national capital contributions (Article 4, ESM Treaty; Article 8, ESM Treaty). Regarding Eurozone governance in general, Dawson (2015, p. 976) warns that many new structures designed in response to the Eurozone crisis 'depart from the mechanisms of legal and political accountability present in previous forms of EU decision-making without substituting new models of accountability in their place'. Our aim is to contribute to the growing body of literature on Eurozone governance reforms. By examining in greater detail the accountability mechanisms applicable to an important new Eurozone body, we identify accountability gaps and shortcomings. As Henning (2017, p. 178) has emphasized, 'the ESM is the first formal, treaty-based institution uniquely for the monetary union'. Therefore, this in-depth case study will yield important insights about the extent to which good governance principles apply to the EMU architecture reconfigured in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis.
From a global perspective, there is growing demand for greater accountability with regard to a range of international financial organisations. Until the 1980s, bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank focused on rather narrow technical missions. Over the past three decades, the IMF and the World Bank have come to perform a much wider range of tasks directly affecting the domestic political arenas of their members.
Many have thus argued that the need for greater accountability of these international financial 2 The ESM Treaty is available from: https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/20150203_-_esm_treaty_-_en.pdf institutions has become more critical (Woods, 2003; Grant and Keohane, 2005 The second section of this paper discusses relevant accountability benchmarks, drawing on the comparative politics, international relations and public administration literatures.
Subsequently, the third section presents the ESM's 'dual institutional embeddedness' which gives rise to unique -what we describe as 'tricky' -accountability challenges. The fourth section provides an assessment of how vertical and horizontal accountability and learning 3 Regulation 472/13 Articles 6 and 7 note that the Member States make a request to the ESM to draw up a financial assistance programme for a country (ESM Member). However, the Commission, in liaison with the ECB, assesses the sustainability of the ESM Member's public debt and develops a draft macro-economic adjustment programme. This programme in turn must be approved by the Council. The ESM's role in the design of the programme is focused principally upon drawing up the lending instruments for the disbursement of funds to the ESM Member. See also Article 13(3) of the ESM Treaty.
perspectives on accountability work in practice in the case of the ESM. The fifth section summarizes the main findings and concludes.
The understanding of the ESM's accountability and the related assessment presented in this paper are primarily based upon a reading of the ESM's legal texts and official documents, and secondary material produced by public bodies, academics and journalists on the ESMin addition to the academic literature on accountability more generally and in relation to specific international, EU and national bodies. Our study also builds on the work of Transparency
International EU, which recently cast its critical eye on the ESM's accountability arrangements (Ban and Seabrooke, 2017) . For our national case study of the ESM's vertical accountability -in order to gain a better appreciation of ESM efforts to explain and justify its policy positions at the national level and national political debates over ESM policies -we conducted a systematic search of the German Bundestag's online archives and the quality German press. In order to corroborate the understanding of ESM financial accountability developed from these readings, we also conducted nine semi-structured interviews with current and former ESM staff, In the comparative politics literature, accountability is considered a cornerstone of legitimacy in representative democracy. It refers to the presence of robust institutional checks and balances and limitations on the actions of public officials to prevent the abuse of power (Schedler, 1999; Przeworski et al., 1999) . Two types of accountability mechanisms are particularly important in the domestic political arena: vertical and horizontal ones. Vertical accountability refers to classical hierarchical governance architectures, where tasks and competences are delegated, for example, by a democratically elected principal to agents.
Principal-agent theory helps identify relevant monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms to ensure that the principal can exercise control over the agents and the set policy objectives are fully met (see, for example, Strøm, 2000; Weingast, 2003) . By contrast, horizontal accountability refers to a system of checks and balances among different institutional bodies which are not linked by a hierarchical delegation of tasks but have sufficient competencies and resources to prevent abuse of power. Furthermore, referring to Lastra and Sham's (2001) definition of accountability, governments and public officials should be able to justify and explain their actions to forums representing the public interest, such as parliaments and courts (see also Amtenbrink 1999) . Courts of auditors ensure the accountability of public bodies through financial and performance audits which can then inform the accountability of these bodies to less specialized bodies, including parliaments.
In public administration, accountability refers to a general sense of responsibility in the political system and willingness to act in a transparent, fair and equitable manner. Furthermore, scholars of public administration define accountability more concretely as a 'social mechanism', an institutional relation or arrangement in which an actor can be held to account by a forum (Mulgan, 2003; Bovens, 2007; Bovens et al., 2008; Bovens, 2010; Wille, 2012) . As proposed by Bovens (2007, p. 450) , accountability as a dyadic relationship 'between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has the obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct' and 'the forum can pose questions'. This conceptualization is particularly helpful to examine the relations between an organization and different potential accountability forums.
Furthermore, Bovens et al. (2008, p. 233) put forward the learning perspective on accountability, where the intended outcome of accountability is to make public authorities both more effective in fulfilling their mandate and more responsive to the needs and preferences of their key stakeholders. This is useful for our analysis of the ESM, as it adds a dynamic dimension of reflexivity, change and learning over time. By contrast, the vertical and horizontal dimensions of accountability are rather static -they concern relations between institutions in a democratic system that change very slowly over time. In Bovens' (2007) The accountability standards discussed above have been developed for and largely applied to the domestic political arena of liberal democracies. At the same time, Woods (2001, p. 4) shows that both vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms, as conceptualized in comparative politics, also apply to international organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. Therefore, we argue that these standards are applicable to the ESM as an international body, but that they need to be adapted to the specific context. At the international level, vertical accountability rests on country representation in the organization and ability to shape decision-making, while horizontal accountability is more diffuse and depends on linkages with other entities and organizations in the international system. Woods (2001, p. 4) argues that accountability is higher in international organizations with balanced representation and lower where a few powerful member states dominate the decision-making process. In terms of horizontal accountability, according to Woods (2001) , in the international arena horizontal accountability is diffuse and is related to the drive toward more transparency, informationsharing and responsiveness to a wider subset of stakeholders such as civil society representatives (Woods and Narlikar, 2003) .
The learning perspective on accountability in the public administration literature is also applicable to international organizations. As Kim et al. (2014) demonstrate, international organizations show the same set of bureaucratic traits examined by public administration scholars in the domestic arena. Over time, they have incorporated many management practices such as strategic and performance management tools originally developed for national public sector bodies. These practices facilitate learning from the organization's past experience in order to fulfil its objectives.
Furthermore, public administration and international relations scholars have pointed out that organizations are often subject to conflicting goals, drawing on examples of national public organizations in OECD countries, international organizations, and non-majoritarian independent regulators (Woods and Mattli, 2010; Koppell, 2010; Busuioc, 2009 ). Thus, multiple accountability mechanisms may apply, and may even be in conflict with each other.
Considering the ESM's similarity to both international organizations such as the IMF and nonmajoritarian bodies in the EU -notably the European Investment Bank (EIB) -we would expect to detect similar trends when evaluating how accountability works in practice. In this respect, the learning perspective is very important, because it can facilitate the reconciliation of different accountability benchmarks (see Black, 2008) . Furthermore, Sabel and Zeitlin (2012) have shown that in EU experimentalist governance the recent turn toward conducting more reviews to promote reflection and learning creates a 'recursive framework' of governance, which leads to the emergence of more dynamic forms of accountability. In addition, the IMF is consulted (see Figure 1) . The three institutions, informally known as the [PLACE FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Assessing accountability in practice in the case of the ESM The ESM's idiosyncratic 'dual institutional embeddedness' is largely due to the crisis-driven design of this body in 2012 and the refusal of certain EU member states to accept Treaty reform in order to create it (Hodson, 2013) . Given the substantial lending capacity of the ESM and the politicisation of the financial stabilisation programmes managed by the European Commission (Dawson, 2015; Moschella, 2017) , it is all the more important to ensure that appropriate accountability mechanisms are in place to guarantee the effective scrutiny of the ESM. At the international level, a close comparative case is the IMF, established to help stabilize countries with balance of payments problems (Woods, 2001) . At the EU level, a comparative case is the EIB which, like the ESM, is a public financial institution with a mandate to lend, albeit in very different circumstances and with distinct objectives.
Vertical accountability is operationalized in terms of examining the extent to which member states participating in the ESM and, specifically, national parliaments seek to monitor and control closely the operations of the mechanism. Horizontal accountability is operationalized by evaluating the checks and balances between the ESM and other bodies in the EU governance system, even though the ESM is not formally part of the EU governance architecture. Lastly, the learning perspective is operationalized by assessing the ESM's internal code of conduct, recommendations by the organization's Board of Auditors, any commissioned internal and external evaluations, and how these are used by the organization in order to reflect upon and improve its operation over time.
Overall, Bovens et al. (2008, p. 225 ) underscore the importance of strengthening existing public accountability arrangements and designing new ones in order to keep up with the creation of new governance frameworks and instruments. The growing literature on this subject has identified both accountability 'deficits' and 'overloads'; finding a middle ground remains a concern. Below we present a set of initial conclusions, drawn by examining the ESM through the lens of vertical, horizontal and learning accountability. This assessment takes into account the ESM's idiosyncratic 'dual institutional embeddedness'.
Vertical accountability
In terms of vertical accountability, the member states participating in the ESM will seek to monitor and control closely the operations of the mechanism. Drawing on research on the IMF, we would expect the mechanism's biggest shareholders to hold key positions in the mechanism's governing bodies and exert the most influence in ESM decision-making (Woods, 2001; Woodward, 2007; Johnson, 2011 The finance ministers of the Eurozone member states can be held to account by their national parliament for their country's individual share in the ESM, but not for the functioning of the ESM as a whole or the country programmes that it has funded. There is a complete absence in the intergovernmental treaty of any mention of a role for national parliaments with regard to the operation of the ESM. Their absence is surprising given the important role assigned to parliaments in national liberal democracies and in the European Union on fiscal policy matters (Armstrong, 2013; Moschella, 2017 Parliament, 2017; European Council, 2017) .
To take the example of the German parliament, we find that ESM matters were voted upon and / or debated eighteen times in Bundestag plenary hearings since 2012 to end June 2018 (see Table 1 ; see also Meiers, 2015, pp. 38-39; Ketterer, 2016) . During the same six-year period, the Bundestag budget committee dedicated roughly three dozen public meetings in whole or in large part to ESM matters, prepared reports, issued statements / opinions and questioned German finance ministry and ESM officials, including Klaus Regling (as on 6
October 2014). In addition to these public meetings, there were closed door meetings of a 
Horizontal accountability
Horizontal accountability refers to checks and balances among the ESM and EU institutions and bodies involved in economic governance. Horizontal accountability encompasses the interactions between the ESM and the European Commission and the ECB, which provide important input to the ESM's decision-making. These bodies, and specifically, their advisory role in deciding upon ESM decisions on capital raising, lending and conditionality are subject 
Learning perspective
The learning perspective on accountability refers to designing robust codes of conduct, internal and external evaluations, and how these are used by an organization to learn and improve its operation over time. In this respect, the ESM has developed both a code of conduct and an auditing architecture to examine its operations. The statutory audit of the ESM is performed by the external auditors and the Board of Auditors (BoA) The Board of Auditors is just one of three bodies in the oversight structure of the ESM; the two others being the internal ESM audit department and the organization selected to conduct the ESM's external financial audit -normally one of the Big Four audit firms, each with a significant presence in Luxembourg. Nevertheless, the BoA is the only body that can give an independent assessment of the actual outcomes of the support programmes funded by the ESM.
It has full access to all ESM documents and reports (Accountant.nl, 2015 ; Court of Audit of the Netherlands, 2012). As the ESM's Managing Director, Klaus Regling, has pointed out, 'the Board of Auditors is an important counterpart to the ESM management. It plays an important role in our corporate governance and guarantees the trust of our shareholders and the general public' (interviewed in Accountant.nl, 2015) . (Strupczewksi, 2017) .
While little is known about the internal decision-making dynamics of the ESM, its 2015
Annual Report, stresses that 'as a publicly funded international institution, the ESM has also moved unilaterally to enhance the transparency of its decision making' (ESM, 2015, p. 83; ESM officials, interview, 15 June 2018) . ESM officials interviewed accept the desirability of the improved reporting on and transparency of the ESM's activities both to other bodies and to the wider public (interviews 7 February 2017; 23 March 2017). However, they also stressed the importance of limiting public transparency on information that could be deemed to be market sensitive. The ESM releases on its website key documents adopted by its two governing bodies on the programme countries. In spring 2016, the ESM made a commitment to publish more details about the country loan programmes discussed in the ESM Board of Governors, the ESM Board of Directors and the Eurogroup. This ESM transparency initiative was introduced in parallel with a similar move in the Eurogroup.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that two forms of accountability -vertical and horizontal -and the learning perspective on accountability are particularly relevant for understanding the ESM's accountability, based on reviewing established benchmarks in the comparative politics, international relations and public administration literatures. The bulk of the perceived inadequacy of the ESM's current accountability arrangements is attributed to its unique institutional design, a point confirmed in most of the interviews undertaken for this study. The ESM's vertical accountability remains limited although the supply of information to national finance ministers and ministries and through them to national parliaments ensures some accountability. Vertical accountability is further reinforced in the five Eurozone member states that grant the national parliament voting powers on ESM capital raising and lending.
While there is no formal obligation for the ESM to be accountable to and engage with Eurozone member state parliaments, in practice, the mechanism has been responsive to the demand for 
